

Vol. 11
1955

C CONTROLLED DISARMAMENT

by

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No. 2
July 11

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Editorial Research Reports
1205 Nineteenth Street, N.W.
Washington

CONTROLLED DISARMAMENT

WAYS AND MEANS of breaking the long deadlock over disarmament will be discussed intensively by the heads of government during the coming Big Four parley at Geneva. New Soviet arms-control proposals, submitted in May to a United Nations disarmament subcommittee, seemed to narrow the gap between western and Russian views on disarmament. Hope therefore has been nourished that President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Eden, Premier Faure, and Marshal Bulganin may be able to supply from the summit the fresh guidance and extra impetus needed to produce eventual agreement at the working level—an agreement which at last would put an end to an arms race that burdens and threatens the peoples of the world as no previous competition of the sort ever did.

President Eisenhower, at his news conference on July 6, left no doubt that the United States was going to Geneva with the earnest desire to explore new approaches to the complex problems of arms limitation and control. "We are going there honestly," he said, "to present our case in a conciliatory, in a friendly attitude, and we don't intend to reject anything from mere prejudice or truculence or any other lesser motive of that kind."

Spokesmen for the 60 large and small nations represented at the anniversary meeting of the United Nations last month pledged renewed efforts to find some workable way both of getting around the atomic impasse and of setting limits to conventional armaments. Many of the diplomats at San Francisco felt there was a good chance that the Geneva conference might open the path to more fruitful continuing negotiations, based on the self-interest of all countries in preventing a nuclear war. When the chairman of the U.N. gathering, Eelco Van Kleffens of the Netherlands, summed up in a closing declaration what he termed the "sense of the meeting," he said with respect to disarmament:

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They [the U.N. members] have pledged themselves equally to press forward in the search for agreement on a disarmament plan that can provide a greater measure of security to the nations and remove the threat of atomic destruction from the world. They declare their . . . determination to direct the creative resources thus freed from the burden of armaments to the improvement of the lives of peoples everywhere.

Van Kleffens conceded that "The difficulties before us are as evident as the dangers and disappointments of the past." However, public and private talks at San Francisco helped to clarify the major points of difference between Soviet and western disarmament proposals. They afforded both sides a more realistic estimate of the areas in which agreement might be found at the Geneva meeting and in subsequent detailed negotiations.

ARMS CONTROL AT GENEVA PARLEY OF THE BIG FOUR

Although differences continued to overshadow possible areas of agreement, in advance of the Big Four conference, both sides gave indications of having modified their thinking and policies on arms limitation as a result of the atomic stalemate. The opposing views, and the evidence of changing positions, were reflected at San Francisco in statements by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, French Foreign Minister Pinay, and Secretary of State Dulles.

Molotov's policy declaration on June 22 reviewed in detail previous Soviet proposals which, he said, offered a means of ending the cold war, easing international tensions, restoring peaceful cooperation, and permitting effective disarmament. With respect to disarmament, Molotov contended that the Soviet proposals of May 10 constituted full acceptance of the western position on phased reduction of conventional armaments; he insisted that Moscow had "met the western powers half way" on the question of control of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, he said, it was up to the United States and the other western powers "to make the next move."

The Soviet foreign minister, relating disarmament to questions of international security, repeated previous Russian proposals for an all-European security pact¹ and implied that a general arms accord could be reached if the western powers would "help create the necessary condi-

¹For summary of previous Soviet security proposals, see "Peaceful Coexistence," *E.R.R.*, Vol. II 1954, pp. 775-772, and "Germany and the Balance of Power," *E.R.R.*, Vol. I 1953, pp. 413-415.

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tions." But the conditions enumerated by Molotov made it clear that the Soviet Union still demanded, as the price of such an accord, the dissolution of the entire free-world system of regional alliances. In specific terms Molotov called upon the western powers to "dismantle military bases in foreign territories" and to abandon what he called "military blocs and alliances" in Europe, in Asia, and in other parts of the world.

The policy statements of Foreign Minister Pinay (June 23) and Secretary Dulles (June 24) were in effect direct answers to Molotov's "necessary conditions" for general disarmament. Pinay said that France was "not prepared to abandon the security insured to it by the [North] Atlantic Treaty Organization," which it regarded as "the best guarantee of peace." He added that he knew of "no foreign military bases" within the Atlantic defense system, only that "common means are made available to service a common peaceful ideal." At the same time, Pinay gave encouragement to the idea of a wider European security system when he said:

These accords concluded on the regional level open the way for agreements to be concluded on the inter-regional level, with the same equality of duties and the same certainty of guarantees. They may offer a solution to the main problems that divide East and West at the present time, including the problem of the division of Germany.

Dulles defended the western collective security arrangements as a "sharing of power," which constituted not only the best guarantee against aggression but also the "best assurance against its own abuse." He credited western unity with bringing the Soviet Union to the conference table, and suggested that it would be prudent to preserve the solidarity that made negotiations possible. Dulles expressed hope that the latest Soviet concessions on disarmament could be translated into "concrete action making possible limitation of armaments on a basis which is in fact dependable and not a fraud."

While evidence of a change in Soviet policy was welcome to all the western powers, the question asked by those making plans for the Geneva meeting was, How far does it go? To what extent does the change modify previous Russian demands and objectives that were—and still are—unacceptable to the West? Does it signal a readiness to undertake genuine negotiations or merely a tactical shift in pur-

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suit of the same Soviet objectives? The Big Four parley may supply the answers or suggest what they will be.

Under procedures suggested by the western powers and accepted by the Soviet Union, the heads of government will not attempt to settle on the spot such complex issues as disarmament and security; they will explore possible areas of agreement, canvass old and new proposals, and settle on the means of continuing negotiations, wherever feasible, through other channels.

SIGNS OF SOVIET READINESS FOR GENUINE NEGOTIATION

The possibility that the Russians may be ready to adopt a realistic approach to disarmament-security problems has been underscored by various western spokesmen. West German Chancellor Adenauer told the Bonn parliament on May 27 he was convinced that "a particularly auspicious moment" had arrived for practical negotiations between the most powerful countries on arms-control measures, because "at this stage of development war has defeated its own purpose." The advance in atomic weapons and development of the hydrogen bomb, Adenauer said, make any war "a gigantic risk for the powers possessing these instruments."

The Soviet Union is not exempt from the risk, Adenauer observed, nor is it immune from pressure to reduce the burden of armaments.

War has ceased to be an instrument of policy; it can no longer achieve more power for any country; it merely spells universal ruin and annihilation. I further consider that the Soviet bloc, too, urgently needs a reduction of its armaments in order to be able to solve the tremendous economic and social problems threatening its existence.

Although the West German chancellor warned that the latest Soviet bloc plan was "full of dangers," he urged the United States to seize the initiative in proposing practical measures for controlled disarmament. During his visit to Washington in June, Adenauer again emphasized the thesis that atomic stalemate has made disarmament a necessity: "It is only on the basis of limited and controlled disarmament that a genuine security system can be established"; such a system, he said, is now imperative.²

² At a news conference in Washington, June 14, Adenauer called controlled disarmament the "first task" of the Big Four meeting, but he cautioned that the free world was "standing on the threshold of what may be a long period of negotiation with an opponent for whom the factor of time does not exist."

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British Foreign Secretary Macmillan told the House of Commons on June 15 that the Soviet change of attitude on disarmament was "a very notable fact" which gave some ground for optimism. Macmillan—like Dulles, Pinay, and Adenauer—bracketed disarmament with European security problems, and saw distinct possibilities for continuing negotiations; but, like the other western foreign ministers, he also saw limits to what it might be possible to achieve.

POSSIBLE BASES FOR ADVANCING THE CONTROL OF ARMS

To most western observers the possibilities for practical accomplishment seem to lie within two main fields. One embraces the concept of a Europe-wide security system based on an exchange of guarantees between the North Atlantic Treaty countries and the Eastern Communist bloc. The other represents the emerging concept of limited, rather than absolute, control of nuclear weapons. Such a system would forgo complete control over all aspects of nuclear weapons development and establish instead an international alarm mechanism calculated to prevent surprise attacks.

The two concepts are closely related, and both have their roots in earlier disarmament plans. The security proposals, not yet formulated in precise terms, are reminiscent of some of the European security pacts developed during the inter-war period. They take account also of certain arms control features incorporated last year in the Brussels Treaty of 1948, which set up the Western European Union, now linked with N.A.T.O.³

The concept of limited, rather than absolute, arms control has its counterpart in disarmament proposals and agreements of the pre-atomic age. The current discussion, however, has been provoked by the Soviet disarmament plan of May 10. In presenting its new proposals the Kremlin not only abandoned previous Russian demands for immediate and total abolition of atomic weapons, but also asserted that absolute international control had become impossible. Joseph Harsch reported in the *Christian Science Monitor*, June 15, that "No pronouncement out of Moscow since the war has received more careful and thoughtful attention in Washington."

³ For Brussels Treaty and W.E.U., see "German Rearmament," *ERR*, Vol. II 1954, pp. 755-772. Present members of the Western European Union are Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Italy, West Germany, United Kingdom.

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EFFECTIVENESS OF ALARM SYSTEM VS. FULL INSPECTION

Officially, the three western governments have not accepted the view that effective international control and inspection are technically impossible; their latest proposals still call for a control organ with unlimited powers of inspection. Yet many leading nuclear scientists of the West have reached, independently, a conclusion very close to that embodied in the Soviet proposal. Chalmers Roberts of the *Washington Post and Times Herald* summarized, June 14, what he termed "the considered opinions today of those within the American scientific community who have expert knowledge of our own and of Soviet nuclear progress."

Absolute control of all fissionable material—including each and every nuclear weapon—is now impossible . . . It is impossible even if international inspectors were free to roam over every acre of the vast Soviet Union or of the United States. It is impossible because it is now relatively easy for either nation to manufacture fissionable material and to fashion A- and H-bombs from it. Nuclear weapons are not yet being made in basement factories, but the "family" of nuclear weapons has expanded to enormous proportions. Wide-scale and widespread manufacture inexorably follows. And any deliberate effort to hide A- and H-weapons becomes less likely of detection.

The fact of central importance, Roberts concluded, is that for the first time the Russians appear to be "reasoning from a set of nuclear-age premises close to much of today's thinking in the United States." It is from these premises that both sides are approaching the idea of some kind of alarm system—a means of detecting mobilization of atomic resources for surprise attack and war.

Discussing the control problem at his July 6 news conference, President Eisenhower indicated that this country was examining such possibilities in connection with a restudy of the whole question of an effective inspection system. He said that "We earnestly want to find some answer to this complicated question" on a basis that would be acceptable to the United States and to other nations.

Application of the current nuclear premises and assumptions to disarmament plans raises grave questions. Is the device of limited control and inspection tangible enough to justify a calculated risk? Could it be made to work if stockpiles could be successfully concealed? Is Moscow really proposing a complete alarm system based on inspection of all essential installations, or is it merely refurbishing pre-

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vious Soviet control plans which Dulles and others have called a fraud?

Chancellor Adenauer's warning against the dangers of the latest Soviet proposals obviously referred to major shortcomings which had been evident in a long line of previous Soviet plans. Secretary Dulles made it clear at a news conference, June 28, that Soviet views and those of the western powers were still far apart on the meaning of effective arms limitation—particularly on vital features of a control mechanism and the principles of a Europe-wide security system.

Record of Past Disarmament Efforts

THE RECORD of past efforts to regulate and control national armaments by international agreement appears, at first sight, to hold relatively little that is applicable to the complex problems of limitation in the age of nuclear weapons. As Van Kleffens conceded at San Francisco, it is a record in which failures and disappointments have overshadowed the few instances of limited success.

Re-examined in terms of the technological revolution of the past decade, most of the earlier disarmament proposals—including those advanced by the United States as well as by the Soviet Union—have been outmoded by the rapid advance of nuclear weapons development. Reviewed in the broader perspective of basic power relationships between nations, however, some earlier chapters in the long history of disarmament efforts continue to have a bearing on the present-day debate over limited vs. absolute arms controls.

ATTEMPTS AT ARMS LIMITATION IN INTERWAR PERIOD

Major efforts to arrest competition in armaments have achieved a degree of success only when the great powers have found it to their national interest to stabilize their respective security positions by international agreements. Conditions prevailing at the time of the Washington Conference of 1921-22, for example, made it possible to negotiate an effective, though strictly limited, agreement on naval armament between the five principal naval powers of

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the day: Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. Britain surrendered its former pre-eminent naval position by accepting equality with the United States; this country scrapped a building program in capital ships that promised to give it supremacy; Japan accepted an inferior position rather than face the prospect of unlimited competition with Britain and America. The famous 5-5-3 ratio in capital ships, extended to certain other categories at the London Naval Conference of 1930, remained in effect for 16 years.⁴

The League of Nations, on the other hand, failed in an ambitious attempt to achieve a global agreement for reduction of armaments "to the lowest point consistent with national safety."⁵ Years of debate over disarmament formulas and mutual security proposals led finally to the convening in February 1932 of a World Disarmament Conference. But the conference, encountering obstacles from the start, was obliged to give up in the autumn of 1933, after the rise of Hitler had produced troublesome German demands and enhanced fears of new German aggression. The League experience, however, demonstrated the close relation between disarmament and security. The Nazi menace destroyed any remaining feeling of safety contributed by the Locarno Treaty of 1925,⁶ which for a time had lessened tensions among the major European powers.

DEVELOPMENT OF U.N. IMPASSE ON ATOMIC CONTROLS

The United Nations Charter did not explicitly affirm, as the League Covenant had done, that reduction of armaments was necessary to maintain peace. The Charter nevertheless empowered the General Assembly, in Art. 11, to consider "the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments"; and in Art. 26 it made the Security Council responsible, as the Covenant had made the League Council responsible, for formulating "plans . . . for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments." As the Charter was

⁴ The treaties expired and naval limitation came to an end on Dec. 31, 1936. See "American Naval Policy," *E.R.R.*, Vol. II 1935, pp. 401-416.

⁵ Art. 8 of the League Covenant put the members on record as recognizing "that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety." The same article made it the duty of the League Council to "formulate plans for such reduction."

⁶ The Locarno Treaty provided for mutual guarantees of the inviolability of the frontiers between France and Belgium on the one hand and Germany on the other.

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drafted before the first atomic bomb was exploded, it made no provision for dealing with the unprecedented problem of international control of atomic energy.

The most intensive work of the United Nations on the problems of controlling nuclear and conventional armaments was concentrated in a period of about two and one-half years—from early 1946 to May 1948.⁷ The first General Assembly, by unanimous vote on Jan. 24, 1946, established a Commission on Atomic Energy composed of members of the Security Council (and Canada when that country was not a member of the Council). The commission was charged with making specific proposals “for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes” and for the “elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other weapons adapted to mass destruction.” Dealing separately with conventional armaments, the Security Council established another commission in February 1947 to work concurrently on the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. The two bodies continued an independent existence until 1951, when they were merged into a single Disarmament Commission.

It was during the initial period that the United States formulated its basic positions on atomic energy control and incorporated them in the Baruch plan, which in turn became the basis for the first majority reports of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission; it was also during the first two years that the Soviet Union registered its fundamental opposition to the principles of international control and inspection upon which the majority based its recommendations. The majority recommendations rested on the premise—not challenged by Russia at that time—that “scientifically, technically, and practically, it is feasible to bring about the control of atomic energy.”⁸

On that original premise all states represented on the U.N. commission, except the Soviet Union, were prepared to recommend an international agency with sufficient power and authority to carry out an effective system of control and inspection. Specific proposals for such a system were made in the second report of the commission (Sept. 11, 1947) over the opposition of the Soviet representative. In

⁷ See “International Control of Atomic Energy,” *E.R.R.*, Vol. I 1948, pp. 71-87.

⁸ First report of U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, Dec. 30, 1946.

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its third report (May 17, 1948), however, the commission declared that it had "reached an impasse" that could not be resolved at the technical level.

The impasse was reached at a time when the United States presumably still held a monopoly in nuclear weapons.⁹ At that stage, the Soviet Union insisted that the first step in international control of atomic energy must be the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and the immediate destruction of existing stocks of atomic bombs and facilities for their manufacture; until such prohibition was accepted and such destruction carried out, Russia would not agree to any plan for international control and inspection. On the other hand, the United States and the majority of the U.N. commission steadfastly held that, until an effective system of international control was in operation, prohibition of atomic weapons would be unenforceable.

PROGRESS TOWARD BREAKING DISARMAMENT DEADLOCK

For the next six years, during which the United States lost its atomic monopoly, there was no perceptible break in the deadlock. Each year the disarmament question came before the General Assembly, and each year large majorities voted for resolutions calling for renewed efforts at both technical and political levels.

After the combined Disarmament Commission was established in 1951, the deadlock which had paralyzed work on atomic control extended to conventional armaments as well. The Soviet Union proposed a general one-third reduction of existing armed forces—a proposal which the western powers rejected on the ground that it would preserve, and perhaps magnify, the imbalance between their limited forces and the large Soviet ground forces.¹⁰ The western powers advanced a plan for balanced, stage-by-stage reductions to levels which would be adequate for defense but not aggression—a concept opposed by the Soviet Union until it was suddenly incorporated as a central feature of the plan offered by Moscow last May 10.

The first sign of a break in the deadlock came last year after the creation of a five-power disarmament subcom-

⁹ The first Soviet atomic explosion was not reported until September 1949.

¹⁰ The Soviet proposal for a one-third overall reduction, first introduced in 1951, was repeated each year through 1954. It was dropped for the first time in the Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955.

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mittee (Canada, France, United Kingdom, United States, and the Soviet Union), which was directed by the full Disarmament Commission to seek a new approach in private talks. The subcommittee held 19 meetings in London, during May-June 1954, in the course of which both sides presented new proposals. Britain and France submitted a plan for phased reductions in conventional armaments, under an effective control system, and for prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons except in defense against aggression. The United States outlined a plan for an international control organ. The Soviet Union maintained its previous position on immediate and total prohibition of atomic weapons, but it made slight concessions on the principle of international control and inspection; however, it continued to oppose the right of international inspectors "to interfere in the domestic affairs of states."

At the General Assembly in New York last autumn, the Soviet delegation suddenly announced that its government was prepared to accept the proposals advanced by Britain and France at London "as a basis for a draft international disarmament convention," and to resume the five-power talks on that basis. This move, which coincided with other Soviet peace gestures,¹¹ was followed in the Assembly by introduction of a disarmament resolution, sponsored jointly by the five powers, calling for early renewal of the London negotiations. The General Assembly unanimously approved the resolution on Nov. 4—the first time Russia and the western powers had voted together on a major disarmament step since the atomic impasse developed.

When the five-power talks were resumed in London early this year, the subcommittee remained in continuous session for almost three months, from Feb. 25 to May 18. During the opening phase, there was little indication that the Soviet Union desired an early agreement on the terms previously proposed by Britain and France. The first Soviet offer—a draft resolution introduced Feb. 25—again called for immediate destruction of existing stocks of atomic and nuclear weapons by all powers possessing such weapons; and the resolution seemed to reject western proposals for phased reduction of conventional armaments. A second Russian offer, made Mar. 18, went part way toward accepting gradual reductions in armed forces and budgetary appropria-

¹¹ See "Peaceful Coexistence," *E.R.R.*, Vol. II 1954, pp. 549-551.

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tions, but Russia still held out for complete prohibition of nuclear weapons regardless of whether an effective control system was in force.

The western powers, meanwhile, had presented a series of proposals based on the Anglo-French plan of 1954; between Mar. 8 and Apr. 11 Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States jointly sponsored four draft resolutions covering both conventional and atomic weapons.¹² In addition, a new Anglo-French memorandum of Mar. 29 proposed specific reductions in the overall armed forces of the principal powers. It was not until May 10, when Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko introduced an entirely new Soviet plan, that Russia appeared to have adopted ideas similar to those put forward in the western proposals.

Current Proposals for Arms Control

THE WESTERN POSITION on disarmament has been based on two central propositions: (1) that reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces must be an integral part of a phased disarmament program, and (2) that prohibition of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons must be preceded by establishment of an international control organization capable of enforcing the prohibition. On the basis of these principles, the western powers offered at London a plan for progressive limitation and reduction of armaments under effective supervision. The formula outlined in last spring's joint draft resolutions called for execution of the following measures in three successive stages, each to be initiated "as soon as the control organ reports that it is able to enforce" the measures:

First stage: (a) Limitation of overall military manpower to levels existing on Dec. 31, 1954, or such other date as agreed upon at a proposed world disarmament conference.

(b) Limitation of overall annual military expenditures, both atomic and non-atomic, to amounts spent in the year ended Dec. 31, 1954, or such other date as may be agreed on.

¹² Texts of these proposals, submitted Mar. 8, Mar. 12, Apr. 18, and Apr. 21, were released by the United States on May 13 after the Soviet Union had made public its plan of May 10 without consulting the western powers. The full series of documents submitted to the subcommittee was published in the State Department *Bulletin*, May 30, 1955.

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Second stage: (a) Execution of one-half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces.

(b) Termination, on completion of (a), of the manufacture of all kinds of nuclear and other prohibited weapons.

Third stage: (a) Execution of second half of agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces.

(b) On completion of (a), total prohibition of nuclear and other prohibited weapons and conversion of existing stocks of nuclear materials to peaceful use.

The four western powers suggested no specific time limits for completion of the respective stages, but they proposed that the arms-control treaty or convention establish such limits. Great Britain and France announced in their joint memorandum of Mar. 29 that they would be prepared to reduce their overall armed forces in the final stage to a level of 650,000 men, for each country, as part of a general scheme of reductions that would fix a uniform ceiling for the three other permanent members of the Security Council (China, United States, and the Soviet Union) at a figure between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 men.¹³ The levels of forces allowed other states would in all cases be considerably lower than those established for the five permanent members of the Security Council.

The powers to be accorded the control organ were spelled out in detail in a separate draft resolution submitted on Apr. 21 by the four western delegations. The international personnel of the control organ would have "full responsibility for supervising and guaranteeing effective observance of all the provisions of the [proposed] disarmament treaty," including the limitations and reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments, as well as the measures relating to nuclear weapons. In order to ensure that the international officials would be in position to carry out their functions effectively, the western powers insisted that they must be stationed permanently in the countries adhering to the disarmament agreement and be accorded:

- (1) Unrestricted access to, egress from, and travel within participating states.
- (2) Unrestricted access to all installations and facilities required for the effective performance of their duties.
- (3) Unrestricted use of communication facilities necessary for the discharge of their responsibilities.
- (4) Inviolability of person, premises, property, and archives.

¹³ The United States had suggested such a ceiling in a working paper submitted jointly with Britain and France at a session of the Disarmament Commission in 1952.

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The western powers made it clear throughout the London talks that acceptance of such a system of international control was, in their view, the essential prerequisite to any disarmament agreement. In a memorandum rejecting the first Soviet proposal of Feb. 25, the four western delegations declared: "Any disarmament plan, to be acceptable, must be drawn up in such a way that each of its stages increases the security of all parties and not the security of only one of the parties at the expense of the others. It must provide genuine and effective international control and inspection, fully competent to ensure its effective execution."

EXTENT OF SOVIET CONCESSIONS IN MAY 10 PROPOSALS

The Soviet proposals of May 10 constituted clear reversal of the stand previously taken by Moscow on the major elements of a disarmament plan. James J. Wadsworth, U. S. representative on the five-power subcommittee, said on May 18 that "To a measurable degree the gaps between us seem to have been lessened." Great Britain's representative, Anthony Nutting, had observed on May 11 that "This latest Soviet declaration appears to make an important advance toward an agreed position on certain of the most important elements in a disarmament treaty." But spokesmen for all of the western powers, while welcoming evidence that the Soviet Union seemed ready to adopt a number of ideas advanced originally by the West, cautioned that the Russian position on other elements of a disarmament treaty—notably an effective control system—was still obscure.

With respect to conventional armaments, Moscow's May 10 proposals accepted in principle the western plan for gradual reduction by stages. In addition, the Soviet plan incorporated the force-level figures suggested in the Anglo-French memorandum of Mar. 29, which contemplated limiting the overall armed strength of the United States, Russia, and China to an agreed total to be fixed at between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 men apiece, and of France and the United Kingdom to 650,000 men apiece.

Reductions of armed forces, armaments, and appropriations for military purposes to agreed levels would be carried out in two stages, each to be completed within fixed time-limits. Half of the agreed reductions would be completed during the first stage in 1956, or in the course of one year after the coming into force of the agreement; the remaining half would be completed during 1957.

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Other specific steps proposed in the Soviet plan included: Full exchange of information among the five powers regarding the existing strength of their armed forces, conventional armaments, and military expenditures; an immediate pledge not to exceed the levels obtaining on Dec. 31, 1954; the convening of a general disarmament conference not later than at some date in the first six months of 1956 to extend arms limitation to other countries, including both members and non-members of the United Nations; and a pledge by nations maintaining military bases on the territory of other states to liquidate such bases.

With respect to nuclear weapons, the May 10 plan dropped Moscow's previous insistence upon immediate and total prohibition; instead, it proposed to allow retention of such weapons during the first disarmament stage "for purposes of defense against aggression, when a decision to that effect is taken by the Security Council."¹⁴ A complete ban on use of atomic and other nuclear weapons would come into effect, during the second stage, when 75 per cent of the scheduled reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments had been carried out. At the same time, existing stocks of nuclear weapons would be eliminated from the armaments of all states, and their production would cease.¹⁵

MAJOR DIFFERENCES ON INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL

Differences between the latest Soviet proposals and those advanced by the western powers center on the vital question of international controls. The western powers have continued to insist that effective international control and inspection are feasible, and that every phase of the disarmament program must be supervised by a control organ fully competent to ensure its execution on a continuing basis. The Soviet Union, while now willing to accept a control agency with limited powers, has challenged the whole concept of effective international control of atomic installations.

In the final section of its May proposals, the Soviet government argued that, even given the existence of a formal agreement on international control, opportunities now exist

¹⁴ Exercise of the veto power in the Security Council would enable any permanent member of the Council to block such a decision.

¹⁵ Britain and France, in a joint memorandum of Apr. 19, declared that they would be prepared to "carry out the process of eliminating all nuclear stocks" and prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in the final quarter of the agreed reductions in conventional armaments; i.e., when 75 percent of those reductions had been completed. The United States made no commitment on this proposal.

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"for evading such control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons." The Soviet statement contended:

This danger is inherent in the very nature of atomic production. It is well known that the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes can be used for the accumulation of stocks of explosive atomic materials, and for their accumulation in constantly increasing quantities. This means that states having establishments for the production of atomic energy can accumulate, in contravention of the relevant agreements, large quantities of explosive materials for the production of atomic weapons . . . In these circumstances, the security of the states signatories to the international convention cannot be guaranteed . . .

To meet the requirements of the present situation, Moscow proposed an international control organ with sufficient power to "prevent a surprise attack by one state upon another." During the first stage in the proposed reduction of armaments, the control body would "establish on the territory of all the states concerned, on a basis of reciprocity, control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and in aerodromes." The function of these posts would be to ensure that no dangerous concentration of land, naval, or air forces took place.

During the second stage, the Soviet plan envisioned somewhat wider powers for enforcement of atomic prohibitions. The control agency would "exercise supervision, including inspection on a continuing basis, to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention by all states"; it would have the right to require a government to furnish "any necessary information" on the execution of disarmament measures and to give "unimpeded access at all times, within the limits of its [the control agency's] supervisory functions, to all objects of control."

Western experts on arms control termed these provisions vague and obscure. Britain's Anthony Nutting said his government would have to study the Soviet proposals with great care, as they did not seem "to have accepted the necessary conditions for effective control." Ambassador Wadsworth of the United States declared on May 11 that "many questions must be asked" regarding the control mechanism, for "if we do not provide a really effective means of seeing to it that agreements reached are carried out, then we will be deluding not only ourselves but all the peoples of the world who hope and long for real disarmament."

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The western powers nevertheless are ready to explore the problem of arms limitation at the Big Four meeting in Geneva on the premise that all countries, including the Soviet Union, want to reduce their arms burdens and lessen the dangers of an atomic conflagration.

ARMS CONTROL SYSTEM OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

Leading spokesmen for the western powers, including Chancellor Adenauer, Prime Minister Eden of Britain, and Foreign Minister Pinay of France, have referred to the possibility of extending to the countries of Eastern Europe certain provisions of western security arrangements which incorporate limited arms-control features. Adenauer and Pinay, in particular, have stressed the arms-control provisions of the revised Brussels Treaty, signed at Paris Oct. 23, 1954, which imposed important limitations on the level of the armed forces of the contracting powers and provided for control and inspection of armaments.

The arms-control features of the Brussels Treaty were worked out at the London and Paris conferences of September and October 1954 chiefly on the insistence of France, who feared that uncontrolled German rearmament might upset the balance of power in Western Europe. The original Brussels Treaty of 1948 had not included Germany as a signatory; in fact, the pact had been conceived as a safeguard against the possibility of future aggression by that country.¹⁶ The London conference agreed to delete from the treaty all mention of German aggression and include general provisions for limitation and control of the armaments of the contracting powers. Under the terms of Protocol No. II, attached to the treaty, the maximum forces which each of the contracting parties would maintain on the mainland of Europe was to be laid down in a special agreement. The level of forces was made subject to review by N.A.T.O. but could not be raised without the unanimous approval of the Brussels powers; to ensure that the agreed levels were not exceeded, inspections were to be carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

A more elaborate control system was established in a separate protocol dealing with armaments and arms manufacture, including production of atomic weapons. Germany

¹⁶ For steps leading to revision and expansion of the Brussels Treaty as a substitute for the European Defense Community, see "German Rearmament," *E.R.R.*, Vol. II 1954, pp. 758-760.

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voluntarily undertook not to manufacture in its territory atomic, biological, or chemical weapons; all of the parties agreed to establish a control agency, under the administrative direction of the Secretary General of the Western European Union, to ensure observance of specified limitations applicable to the continental countries.

The Brussels control agency was guaranteed free access, on demand, to arms manufacturing plants in the member states, and to whatever statistical and budgetary information it requires. Its inspections are not to be of a routine character but are to be carried out at irregular intervals by "test checks" and unannounced visits at production plants and arms depots.

Although some experts have suggested that the Brussels system might serve as a model for a wider control mechanism to cover the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, others have expressed grave doubt that such a system would work in the absence of mutual trust and confidence among the participating nations. The Brussels model is certain to be explored, however, as the search for an effective means of international control is pursued.

